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  • br Introduction Even before the

    2018-11-13


    Introduction Even before the earliest conceptions of a juvenile justice system, adolescents and young adults have presented unique challenges to policy-makers (Steinberg, 2009). Higher incidents of criminal activity, substance use disorders, and the emergence of psychopathologies are often reported during this sensitive time period amongst a range of potentially comorbid factors (Bava and Tapert, 2010; Cohen and Casey, 2014). Prominent aspects include an increase in risky behaviors, higher degrees of sensation seeking and impulsivity, greater sensitivity to rewards, and heightened reactivity to threat and punishment (Benthin et al., 1993; Brown et al., 2015; Dreyfuss et al., 2014). A particular locus of concern pertains to the functional neuroanatomy of adolescent development and autonomy in decision-making from young, to full adulthood, particularly within and amongst socio-affective environments known to have a profound impact on cognition and behavior. Impeded decision-making abilities have been reported in response to emotionally charged-situations, peer influence, and paradigms assessing the salient nature of rewards and punishment (Brown et al., 2012a; Dreyfuss et al., 2014; Gardner and Steinberg, 2005; Ladouceur, 2012; Mueller, 2011; Somerville and Casey, 2010). Indeed, these matters are currently being debated at the intersection of law and neuroscience, where legal decisions regarding the criminal culpability of juveniles remain in flux (Cohen and Casey, 2014; Jones et al., 2014; Steinberg, 2008). Legal issues concerning the age of majority beg the question − when should an adolescent be considered an adult (Cohen et al., 2016)? In all aspects of development, a great deal of heterogeneity exists amongst typically and non-typically developing populations (Fair et al., 2012b). Particular characteristics may predispose certain subgroups of individuals more than others with a greater inclination toward risk. Some of these characteristics may normalize over time, in part due to structural and functional order olda maturation; but regardless of age, there is much uncertainty regarding which individuals are most at-risk. Simply stated, while on average the increased prevalence of risky behavior and irrational decision-making across the adolescent and young adult periods have been shown repeatedly, not all adolescents fit this behavioral profile (Steinberg, 2008). This variation across individuals may explain why general hypotheses concerning mismatches in brain development (e.g. dual-process models, grey matter vs. white matter, subcortical vs cortical regions), cognitive control and emotional regulation (hot/cold, top-down/bottom-up, BIS/BAS, etc.) have difficulty accounting for the myriad of behaviors and heterogeneity reported in Deletion timeframe (Cohen and Casey, 2014; Mills et al., 2014). Importantly, developmental differences are often reported in the absence of emotional stimuli and without context. A key advancement in the study of development with respect to atypical behavior lies in exploring these relationships while taking into consideration the “brain state” in which a decision is made.
    Methods
    Results
    Discussion
    Author contributions
    Competing financial interests
    Acknowledgements We greatly acknowledge the assistance of Eric R. Earl at OHSU for pipeline preparation and assistance. This work was funded by the MacArthur Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (B.J.C., D.A.F., A.G., L.S.) and was supported by the National Institutes of Health (Grants R01 MH096773 and K99/R00 MH091238 to D.A.F.), Oregon Clinical and Translational Research Institute (D.A.F.). The contents of this manuscript reflect the views of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the official views of either the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation or the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (www.lawneuro.org).
    Introduction Social acceptance is of key importance in life. Receiving positive social feedback increases our self-esteem and gives us a sense of belonging (Thomaes et al., 2011). Receiving negative social feedback, in contrast, can induce feelings of depression, and rejected people often react with withdrawal (Nolan et al., 2003). Social rejection can, however, also trigger feelings of anger and frustration, and can lead to reactive aggressive behavior (Dodge et al., 2003; Nesdale and Lambert, 2007; Chester et al., 2014; Riva et al., 2015; Achterberg et al., 2016). Most developmental studies have focused on the withdrawal reaction after social rejection, while relatively few have examined reactive aggression. The few studies that examined rejection-related aggression showed that early peer rejection was associated with an increase in aggression in children aged 6–8 (Dodge et al., 2003; Lansford et al., 2010). Several prior studies have also shown that rejection can lead to immediate aggression (Chester et al., 2014; Riva et al., 2015; Achterberg et al., 2016). These immediate effects may be associated with emotional responses to rejection and a lack of impulse control. Although several studies have focused on neural processes involved in negative versus positive social feedback processing, the neural processes involved in dealing with negative or positive social feedback versus a neutral baseline in middle childhood are currently unknown.