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    • Cyanine5.5 alkyne This new economic context has increased

    2018-11-15

    This new economic context has increased the pressure on the social dilemma with which managers are confronted. Should organizations cooperate for mutual and global posterity, or should they compete to ensure and maximize on their winnings in this particularly egoistic environment. Both sides of the equation seem very logical and debatable. What our review of literature shows is that in the face of this additional complexity, organizations have decided to cooperate competitively. Indeed, in the face of the economic pressure organizations cooperate through the creation of strategic alliances such as joint ventures, mergers, and acquisitions to increase their financial wealth, R&D potential, market access, and product portfolio. The aim of such cooperation might also be to minimize political and economic risk. Yet although they cooperate, organizations simultaneously compete to gain more than their partners from this cooperation. This has often been described as coopetition, a concept popularized by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). Our belief is that it corresponds to a form of distorted cooperation, without any cooperative essence. If we go back to the definition of cooperation in very simple words, we propose to frame it as follows: “I should deploy all my efforts to satisfy my needs then I will do all I can to help achieve satisfy yours (not at my expense, but through value creation).” (Wheeler, 2003). However today׳s organizations manage their cooperation in a way that we describe as follows: “I shall deploy all my effort to achieve my maximum potential (Fig. 1). As long as you are beneficial to me I will show a level of support and commitment, yet behind the scene I am getting ready to compete and win you over when and if needed”. We believe this corresponds to a distorted version of cooperation. It carries and delivers more Cyanine5.5 alkyne than cooperation.
    Part I: Why competitive strategies dominate in difficult economic conditions? By definition: “Social dilemmas are situations in which individual rationality leads to collective irrationality. This is, reasonable behavior leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off than they might have been otherwise. Many of the most challenging problems we face, from the interpersonal to the international, are at their core social dilemmas” Kollock (1998). For more explanations, Kollock continues by saying that: “All social dilemmas are marked by at least one deficient equilibrium. It is deficient in that there is at least one other outcome in which everyone is better off. It is equilibrium in that no one has an incentive to change their behavior. Thus, at their worst, social dilemmas exemplify the true meaning of tragedy: “the essence of dramatic tragedy” wrote Whitehead, “is not unhappiness. It resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things”. A group of people facing a social dilemma may completely understand the situation, may appreciate how each of their actions contribute to a disastrous outcome, and still be unable to do anything about it. The most severe social dilemmas are also characterized by a dominating strategy that leads to a deficient equilibrium. A dominating strategy is a strategy that yields the best outcome for an individual regardless of what anyone else does. The compelling, and perverse, feature of these dilemmas is that there is no ambiguity about what one should do to benefit oneself, yet all are hurt if all follow this rational decision. However, not all social dilemmas involve dominating strategies”. (Kollock, 1998).
    Dilemma Game illustrative example Game theory is used to model a wide variety of economic settings. The choice settings in which economists apply game theory are generally small number settings in which individual decisions and welfare are interdependent. That is to say, in economic games each person׳s welfare depends, in part, on the decisions of the other individuals “in the game”. Again, the basic problem occurs when the pursuit of self-interest by each leads to a poor outcome for all. To elaborate we refer to the work by Axelrod (1984)“In the Prisoner Dilemma game, there are two players. Each has two choices, namely cooperate or defect. Each must make the choice without knowing what the other will do. No matter what the other does, defection yields a higher payoff than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both had cooperated. As illustrative example: A district attorney knows that two prisoners are indeed guilty of a crime, he doesn’t have acceptable evidence to convince a jury. The alleged criminals know this. The district attorney presents the following choice problem to each of the prisoners separately. The prisoners are kept separated. Each is given the choice of not confessing or confessing. Game summarizedFig. 1. If neither confess = both cooperate, each will get a one year sentence, payoff = 3 for each. If one confesses = defect/cooperate, the confessor goes free, and the other is sentenced for 5 years, payoff = payer one gets 0, players 2 gets 5. If both confess = both defect, each will get three years, payoff = 1 for each”.